Lyndon Johnsons Vietnam War Strategy

Lyndon Johnsons Vietnam War Strategy LYNDON JOHNSON’S PEACE INITIATIVES DURING THE VIETNAM WAR â€Å"What did the Johnson administration hope to achieve from diplomatic efforts to resolve the Vietnam War between 1965 and 1968 and with what success?† Introduction: Lyndon Johnson had become highly besieged in the pursuit of his Vietnam policy. Most historical arguments centre round his inept handling of the situation, in which he escalated the bombing offensives and then tempered them down making a mess of the peace moves, which were never done with any serious intent. The core of the historical criticism of the president is that he allowed himself to be blindly guided by inappropriate advice from Robert McNamara, and caused avoidable loss to American lives. Obsessed with the idea of keeping the armed forces subordinate to the presidency, the Johnson administration gave instructions that were out of sync with the happenings on the battlefield. This paper takes a look at these developments, while listing in some detail the peace moves he tried to make, and how they came a cropper. It finally looks at the reasons for their failures, and tries to point out who could be held responsible for the fracas. Limitations of this paper Since this paper is about a highly narrowed down topic, a background to the war and its developments is not made; this paper is limited to discussing its defined purview, and hence these details and the persons involved in the war are taken as given. Need for negotiations In order to understand with what objectives the president initiated negotiations, it is necessary to understand the situation that forced him to make these moves. With a series of ill-conceived actions, the president had crossed the Rubicon over Vietnam. Well into the middle of his term, it was a thorn in the flesh from which there seemed no reprieve for the beleaguered president, even as enormous pressure mounted at home to end the war. As aptly summed up, â€Å"Vietnam was a stalemate producing irreconcilable domestic divisions and a nightmare†¦from which Johnson could not awake.† (Dallek, 1998, p. 443) From the sunny days of his presidential campaigning of 1964, when less than a third of the population saw Vietnam as the most pressing problem the nation faced to a near doubling of this figure by the winter of 1965-66, the decline in support for the president’s policies on Vietnam was rapid. (Dallek, 2004, p. 251) His gauche at handling the press was also another factor for this situation, with the result that Vietnam soon became, in the perception of the American public, â€Å"President Johnson’s war†. (Liebovich, 1998, p. 45) Egged on by his Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, Johnson had given the war efforts no respite; he was firmly convinced that all it needed were a few more bombings and a few successful fights to end the war. He could not have been more off the target; while the president’s men assessed that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese regular armies could be subdued, the latter resorted to guerrilla tactics, from scattered and well-spread positions. The result was calamitous –by 1967, nearly half a million Americans had been sent to Vietnam, of whom the total casualties were in the region of 100,000, among whom no less than a seventh had lost their lives. (Liebovich, 1998, p. 44) Although the Government of South Vietnam, (GVN), whose fragile nature had for so long worried the US, had coalesced, with the Cao Ky coup by the beginning of 1966, the Johnson administration was in a bind about the policy it had to pursue, because astronomical sums were going down the drain. An April 1966 intra-governmental policy review had not seen any major reason for hope. The views of the presidential staff differed sharply from those of the men on the battlefield. Air strikes, on which the administration had pinned its highest hopes to achieve a breakthrough in the war, had come to a virtual naught, and were becoming a colossal waste of resources. One of the prime air strike programmes, ROLLING THUNDER, in the assessment the Institute of Defense Analysis made in the summer of 1966 had â€Å"had no measurable direct effect†. This was after the air strikes on the highly strategic and vulnerable areas of Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants, (POL) of the Democratic Republic of Nor th Vietnam (DRV). (Gelb Betts, 1979, pp. 146-148) At this point, the lack of effectiveness of the bombing strategy was also severely compounded by the exorbitant cost of carrying out these operations, which according to the CIA, cost almost ten times as much as the gains they brought. Having dropped as much as 643,000 tons of bombs on North Vietnam, the cost of this on the US exchequer was $ 9.60 for every dollar’s worth of damage they inflicted on the DRV with only half the fighter bombers having the capability of surviving the year-long stint as pilots. (Wiest, 2003, p. 27) This terrible cost of escalation was also reflecting on the economy, taking it on an inflationary spiral, and threatening to neutralise its post-war gains. (Isserman Kazin, 2000, p. 224) Gold prices were becoming very volatile, and all these contributed to completely undermine his ‘Great Society’ programme, on which he had come to power, (Reiter Stam, 2002, p. 121) and whose central theme was economic growth accompanied by poverty reduction. (Brown-Collier, 1998) In addition, another extremely important factor was threatening to bring the president on his knees –sustained antiwar movement, that had been inspired by the success of the Civil Rights movement. On the field, the highhandedness of the American forces had only succeeded in making the South support the North, and the infiltration of men and other supplies from the North. Through the Ho Chi Minh Trail, an estimated 90,000 men infiltrated to the South between 1965 and 1967. The Americanisation of South Vietnam was a total disaster. (Best, Hanhimà ¤ki, Maiolo Schulze, 2004, pp. 296) It was in the wake of these major drawbacks associated with continued bombing that the president was forced to mellow his position. By December 1966, the administration was convinced that since there was no way by which they could win the war, at least by election time, the only road that lay ahead was negotiation, (Dallek , 1998, p. 444) since this was the only way by which he could reverse these conditions. However, as the next section illustrates, he was no better at these negotiations, either. Johnson’s objectives, the negotiations and reasons for their failure These debacles were to reflect heavily on the president personally; by December 1966, the realisation had clearly and irrevocably dawned on the administration that unless the Americans ended the war at the earliest, it would reflect badly on the nation’s elections of 1968. At this stage, there was no alternative to negotiation, if the president was to have the slightest chance of re-election. From the high perch at which the president was seated, the only non-negotiable point at the discussions now became a separate state within South Vietnam (SVN), and a non- communist government for the president. (Dallek, 1998, p. 443) The first concrete steps towards negotiation were taken furtively, in 1966. At this point, the US was still very imperious, even though it was the one that initiated the negotiation. It made a blanket, unconditional demand –that the DRV stop infiltration into the south for bombing to stop. The first of these steps, known as bombing pauses, was hardly f ruitful. Taking off from here, the Johnson administration made a clearer move towards negotiation at the Manila Conference in the Declaration of Peace in 1966. The aim of the administration, which was to negotiate from a position of strength, offered the condition that the US would withdraw from South Vietnam within six months of Hanoi withdrawing the last of its troops from there. However, the DRV too was equally determined to bargain from a position of strength. The result was that the Johnson administration was seen to be keen on making peace, but within the administration, the same problem of the mismatch in thinking between the executive and the armed forces remained, (Gelb Betts, 1979, p. 151) because the president, in whose mind the famous spat between Harry Truman and Gen. Douglas McArthur during the Korean War had been weighing heavily, decided that the best way to avoid a repeat of such a situation now was to keep the military under the firm control of the presidency. Unf ortunately, he was ham-handed in doing this, ending up in only isolating the military and creating a terrible disharmony between the two. (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 216) Accordingly, after the raids of December 13 and 14, the president ordered a Christmas ceasefire, and extended it up to January 1 as a goodwill gesture. The main objective for Johnson at this stage was securing the territorial integrity of the north and south of Vietnam, or all Vietnam, should its people choose reunification. His objective was also clearly aimed at silencing his critics at home, of whom there was no dearth. He sought to make these moves towards negotiations to silence the doves in the Congress, who kept insisting on negotiations, and the American public, who were becoming war-weary. (Dallek, 1998, pp. 443-448) The quick progress Eugene McCarthy made at the Hampshire primaries jolted the president about his sagging popularity. Drawing from McCarthy’s success, Robert Kennedy, too decided to challenge t he president. (Isserman Kazin, 2000, p. 224) Internally, the most urgent need for him was to use the Vietnam War as a means to finish off his political rivals at home, chief among whom was Robert Kennedy. â€Å"For all his hope and brave talk about progress in the fighting, he still feared that the war would destroy him politically and open the way to a successful Kennedy bid for the presidency.† (Dallek, 1998, p. 448) There was also another factor –a change in US attitudes towards China, following the perception of Chinese expansion being the cornerstone of a Vietnam policy getting significantly reduced around the middle of 1966. (Parker, 1989, p. 142) Johnson hoped that he could hold his people together while using the armed forces and air strikes to force the Hanoi government to buckle just in time to give him a great fillip for the 1968 elections. Internationally, too, he was keen to be seen as a man who was interested in peace, accepting British and Russian offers to mediate, albeit reluctantly. He followed these up with another ceasefire for February 6-13. (Dallek, 1998, p. 446) Peace moves Operation Marigold was the name given to the Johnson administration’s attempt to make peace with Hanoi through indirect means, by which intermediaries in the form of emissaries of neutral countries were sent to develop channels of communication. It first started when the Polish member of the International Control Commission, Janusz Lewandowski apprised the Italian ambassador in Saigon, Giovanni d’ Orlandi and then the US ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., about Ho Chi Minh’s mind. The North Vietnamese leader was surprisingly amiable to US propositions. He suggested that if the Americans suspended bombing, he was more than willing to talk with them; an even greater surprise was that he was not going to insist that a socialist regime be established in the South, would not meddle in the affairs of the southern government, and that he was willing to consider a â€Å"reasonable calendar† for American withdrawal. Yet, in typical hubris, the John son administration threw away an easy way out of the conflict that had presented itself on a platter. The reason? Washington’s perceived untrustworthiness of the neutrality of communist Poland. Such a baffling, completely unfounded assumption destroyed a great chance for peace. A glaring example of the complete lack of coordination between the presidential and military staff, the basic reason for which bombing had not stopped earlier, showed itself up in December 1966. While the US ambassador in Poland, John Gronouski, was making preparations for a highly sensitive meeting with Polish officials, out of the blue, the US dropped bombs on sensitive targets in Hanoi heavily on December 2 and 3. This completely set the clock back on whatever little progress the Poles were making towards negotiating with the DRV, which centred round the issue of bombing. To this, the unrepentant administration offered the flimsiest of reasons for which the air strikes could not go ahead as planned on November 10 – bad weather! Further, even the planned attacks on December 13 and 14 went ahead as scheduled, giving the Marigold initiative a quick burial. Analysts are of the opinion that even after the bombings of December 2 and 3, there was hope for some salvage, but that the Johnson administration, which had in the first place created the truce move, killed it with its own hands. The simple reason for this was the total lack of sincerity on the part of the Johnson administration about going ahead with the bombing pauses. After briefly halting its bombings in mid-December, the US once again insisted that Hanoi reciprocate unequivocally. It read wrongly the situation on the ground in Hanoi in mid-late January 1967. With the DRV Foreign Minister, Ngoyen Duy Trinh’s tough words on January 28, demanding that the US stop its bombings immediately, the official obituary to the Marigold initiative came to be written. (Gelb Betts, 1979, pp. 152, 153) The fate of another such mission, Operation Sunflower, was no different; having been declared on February 6, 1967, the first reaction it drew was a strong letter from Ho Chi Minh, who warned the president that â€Å"the people of Viet Nam are determined not to surrender under the threats of bombing†. (Brigham, 1998, p. 143) This phase offered a six-day bombing pause in February 1967. Even while the Americans were again strict on the condition of reciprocity from North Vietnam, that of stopping infiltration, the administration gathered evidence that the North Vietnamese were taking advantage and were supplying arms to the South, forcing Washington to drop the plan. Another initiative was the San Antonio formula of September-December 1967. This, too, did not offer anything new or different; it reiterated American willingness to stop bombing and talk, if the North met its obligation of supplying arms to the South. North Vietnam, predictably, dismissed the offer. There were other initiatives for negotiation, too, between October 1966 and February 1968. Starting with moves initiated on the occasion of the funeral of Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, other steps, clearly half-hearted, were taken. These, in addition to neutral moves by eminent persons and the Glassboro summit, were given high sounding codenames such as Packers, Aspen, Ohio and Pennsylvania. (Gelb Betts, 1979, p. 163) Another prominent attempt of a peace mission was that of the Italian cleric, Giorgio La Pira in 1965. To his desperate pleas to end the war, all that the Johnson administration made was this indifferent reaction: State Department Executive Secretary Benjamin Read commented to presidential advisor, Walt Rostow thus: â€Å"[La Piras] telegram is another in a voluminous series of peace messages. In view of La Piras well-known position on Vietnam and other issues, it is recommended no reply be made.† (Miller, 1999, p. 143) The net result of these peace overtures was a near zero. All these gave rise to the Tet offensive. (Gelb Betts, 1979, p. 165) This was the event that signalled what a morass the US had got into. On the night of January 31, 1968, some troops owing their allegiance to the North Vietnamese leader attacked the American embassy of Saigon. Although the Americans put it down in no time, the event opened the floodgates to the seemingly never-ending nature of the war, showing up the complete lack of understanding of the war of the American soldiers, who went on the rampage, committing acts of unheard of savagery. (Isserman Kazin, 2000, p. 223) Thus, while peace was being sought, the actions of the administration took the two sides anywhere but there. Conclusion While fixing the blame for the failures of the negotiations processes, students of history need to see the situation in the backdrop of the Cold War era. In retrospect, in the age of extremely fierce rivalry between the two superpowers played out through their allies, perhaps some of the blame can be mitigated from Johnson when he refused to trust the Polish, a staunch communist country. To be fair, he was only reciprocating an attitude of great mutual distrust of the Cold War protagonists. (Vandiver, 1997, p. 156) However, it needs to be said that on this particular, extremely important occasion, he was allowing the history of their relationship to cloud his judgement, when there appeared no motive on the part of the Polish other than to bring about a ceasefire during Operation Marigold. The bottom line of the historic criticisms against Johnson relates to his oscillation between escalation and negotiation, the total disconnect between the executive and the armed forces, and the catastrophic consequences these produced. Offensives continued even as Operation Marigold was on; later, two months into the Tet offensive, there were no concrete results, by when the president had made up his mind not to run for the 1968 elections. This decision made no great difference: the purpose for which the bombing operations took place, forcing North Vietnam to end its support for Vietcong, was not served. The bombings of ROLLING THUNDER were in no way deterring a regrouping of the North Vietnamese guerrilla fighters, who still possessed all the strength to defeat the South Vietnamese Army. (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 216) Taking an overall view of the escalation and the failure of the peace negotiations, it is difficult to point an accusatory finger at anyone other than the president. The decision to escalate the offensive was entirely his and McNamara’s. In dealing with the situation, the president had thoroughly misread the situation, and had kept insisting to the American public that the war was all but won. At no stage of the war did the president behave in a manner befitting his office. In what was to be the ultimate show of lack of conviction in the peace moves, the man he appointed to oversee the peace negotiation, Averell Harriman, was never invited to the Tuesday Lunches briefings, where updates about the situation used to be made! Moreover, the Johnson administration regarded bombings as its biggest bargaining chip, a basis upon which all its negotiations were to proceed. A lack of coordination and understanding between these two vital organs was one of the prime reasons for the failu re of whichever peace missions the president undertook. (Gelb Betts, 1979, p. 151) Neither his offensives, nor the peace moves he made later when left with no other choice was done in the right spirit. As a result, the president’s handling of the Vietnam War was to dwarf the stature of one of America’s tallest presidents. References Best, A., Hanhimà ¤ki, J. M., Maiolo, J. A., Schulze, K. E., (2004), International History of the Twentieth Century, Routledge, London. Brigham, R. K., (1998), Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLFs Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. Brown-Collier, E. K., (1998), Johnsons Great Society: Its Legacy in the 1990s. Review of Social Economy, Vol. 56, No.3, p. 259+. Retrieved May 13, 2006, from Questia database. Dallek, R., (1998), Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973, Oxford University Press, New York. Dallek, R., (2004), Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President, Oxford University Press, New York. Gelb, L. H., Betts, R. K., (1979), The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. Isserman, M., Kazin, M., (2000), America Divided The Civil War of the 1960s, Oxford University Press, New York. Jacobsen, M., (1996), 13 President Johnson and the Decision To Curtail Rolling Thunder. In The Tet Offensive, Gilbert, M. J. Head, W. (Eds.) (pp. 215-227), Praeger, Westport, CT. Liebovich, L. W., (1998), The Press and the Modern Presidency: Myths and Mindsets from Kennedy to Clinton, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT. Miller, J. E., (1999), 5 Ambivalent about America: Giorgio la Pira and the Catholic Left in Italy from NATO Ratification to the Vietnam War. In The United States and the European Alliance Since 1945 /, Burk, K. Stokes, M. (Eds.) (pp. 127-144), Berg, New York. Parker, F. C., (1989), Vietnam: Strategy for a Stalemate (1st ed.), Paragon Press, New York. Reiter, D., Stam, A. C., (2002), Democracies at War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Vandiver, F. E., (1997), Shadows of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnsons Wars (1st ed.), Texas AM University Press, College Station, TX. Wiest, A., (2003), The Vietnam War, 1956-1975, Routledge, New York.

Indegenous People Native Tile

Native title is a concept in the Australian law. It is a type of continuous ownership of land by local indigenous Australian. However native title can be combined with non-indigenous proprietary rights. Common law and aboriginal law develop this concept In case of any discrepancy between Australian law and customary aboriginal law, the non-indigenous rights will generally prevail. Native title is a land title and it was recognized in Australia during 1992 by the High Court in the Mabo decision. The native title linked with groups of people whom traditional connections between the lands, waters among the aboriginal people.The native title rights recognized under Australian law. The native titleholders protected to get compensation if governments acquire their land or waters for future developments. The native title is different from land rights. Native title is available to Aboriginal groups with traditional ties to land. Hence people who have always lived in the same area can claim n ative title. The native title is recognized by Commonwealth legislation. On 1st September 1995, the Bardi and jawi people of Dumpier Peninsula and islands of Buccaneer Archipelago filed an application for a native title determination.After registration and public notification more than 155 persons were joined as parties to the application. At last the claim was made on behalf of the Bardi and Jawi people. The applicants i. e. Bardi-Jawi people sought a native title determination in regard to land, waters, water courses, reefs, seas and seabed in the Northern Dampier and Kind Sound Regions of Western Kimberley-Lombadina and One Arm Point, Western Australia. The claim of native title rights and interest which includes rights to the possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the areas.Besides it protection of cultural knowledge also claimed. The main opponent Western Australian Fishing Industry Council and Telstra were opposed the application. Federal Court Judge Robert French had gi ven a judgment in favor of a native tile application by the Bardi and Jawi people. Their claim is at about 1,037-sq. km area of land at the northern end of Dampier Peninsula. This land surrounded by areas of sea to a three nautical mile boundary comprising Aboriginal reserves and unallocated crown land with many of the 900-strong community living on or near the area.The judge also ruled that the Bardi and Jawi people had exclusive rights to the whole of the mainland they had claimed, as well as right to hunt turtle and dugong in waters in the area and to take pearl shell for cultural purposes, which includes the following rights based on the Sec. 225 Native Title Act indicates the rights and interests. The rights include use and enjoyment rights and these are not limited to the following rights § 1. The right to live on the land 2. The rights to access move about on and use the land and waters 3. The right to hunt and gather on the land and waters4. The right to engage in spiritua l and cultural activities on the land and waters 5. The right to access, use and take any of the resources of the land (including ochre) for food, shelter, medicine, fishing and trapping fish, weapons for hunting, cultural, religious, spiritual, ceremonial, artistic and communal purposes 6. Right to refuse, regulate and control the use and enjoyment by others of the land its resources, 7. The right to have access to and use the water of land for personal, domestic, social, cultural, religious, spiritual, ceremonial and communal purposes.In relation to the offshore waters, the rights were limited to non-exclusive rights of access and use of the areas resources. These rights are exercisable in accordance with the traditional laws and customs of the native titleholders and the laws of the State and Commonwealth. However these are subject to the certain other rights and interest such as 1. Use and Benefit of Aborigines 2. Fishing and aquaculture licenses 3. The interest of Telstra Corpo ration Limited 4. Public right to fish and navigate in tidal waters 5.International right of innocent passage The exclusive native title rights cannot be granted in relation to any flowing or underground waters and the taking of resources cannot be done for commercial purposes. Not only the bardi – jawi people or any other persons can be used. LEGAL The Native Title Act, 1993 §, which was in force from 1st January 1994. In order to provide native title rights, the Act was established. The Australia’s legal and parliamentary systems required providing such native rights to the persons in order to enable economic activity.It was forced by the decision of High court in the case of Mabo Vs. State Queens µ land. The determination of native title in a particular area, land or water depends upon the group of persons and their interests. The offshore place means the water within the limits of the State only. BLUE REEF With regard to the Brue Reef, the evidence established its importance in the mythology or cosmology of the applicants, it did not establish that the law devolved rights in relations to land or waters as a result.This leaves the claimant group unable to protect an important spiritual site. Here the judge has placed undue weight on activity-based use-rights of members of the group and thereby discounting the importance of indigenous forms connection to land. Instead more importance to be given the indigenous rights. In the case of Sampi Vs State of Western Australia. The part of Brue Reef, which lies within 12 nautical mile limit. There was no basis disclosed on the evidence of native title rights in Brue Reef and hence the Bardi/Jawi claim was dismissed.The rights and interest claimed that includes access and use and enjoyment of the reef, and it cannot be as an exclusive right. The Blue Reef also comes under non-exclusive right.  § NON-EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS Non-exclusive rights also proposed to be recognized over the inter tidal zones and associated reefs and areas of water. With regard to the Blue Reef area though it may be evidently noticed the use as traditional and occasional visit and it may be religious significance, the exclusive right to use the persons only cannot be issued. However they can go as usual beside all other like people will go.Mere visiting to the places does not confer any privilege to get the exclusive right only particular people should go which attraction of non-violence of international treaties. It was linked with the claim, which was made by the Bardi-Jawi people previously. The rejection of claim will not be amounted to the exploitation of the Bardi-Jawi people. Hence the claim of Bardi-Jawi people with regard to the Blue Reef cannot be entertained which was linked with more than 12 nautical miles of the water. The non-exclusive possession native title rights exist to the Bardi Jawi people.With this they have the right to access, hunt dugong and turtle, and take resources for food, relig ious, spiritual, cultural, ceremonial and communal purposes. It includes used pearl shell for ceremonial purposes in accordance with the traditional laws and customs. EXCUSIVE RIGHTS The rights over land include the right to live on the land, right to access, move about and use the land, the right to hunt and gather, the right to engage in spiritual and cultural activities, the right to use resources including food and ochre and the right to refuse, regulate and control the use of the land by the others.The rights over areas of water include the right to use and enjoy the reefs and associated water, the right to hunt and gather, including for dugong and turtle and the right to use the resources for food, trapping fish, religious, cultural and ceremonial purposes. Their basic claim was registered in the case lies only with three nautical mile limit back to the commencement point. The claim of Bardi Jawi people first lodged in 1995. Before the claim went to trial and later amended the area from 12 nautical miles offshore to three nautical miles.Hence the claim again cannot be entertained, which was already decided with the three nautical miles of the water. ADVISE TO THE COUNSEL Based on the above, it is identified the following suggestions for which counsel may not entertain the Bardi-Jawi arguments. 1. The claim of Bardi-Jawi people for extension of 12 nautical lines cannot be entertained since they have claimed earlier for three nautical miles only. Once the decision was made cannot be reopened in the same issue. If it is accepted again they will raise for another. 2.With regard to the Blue Reef, which extends beyond sixteen nautical miles from the coast cannot be entertained. Traditional custom is not exclusive right for which every other person can also go. Though it is evidenced by several years that Bardi-Jawi people are using and going for religious significance, exclusive right rights cannot be permitted. 3. The native title right cannot be recognized o n the sea beyond 12 nautical miles, which attract the violation international treaties. The distinction between the existence of native title under traditional law and custom and its recognition by the common law was made in Fejo Vs.Northern Territory, 1998.  µ 4. Those rights and interests will be continued in spite of non- recognition by the common law may be taken into account in the definition of the connection with land and waters, which indigenous people may have by virtue of their traditional laws and customs. 5. The Bardi-Jawi also granted previously non-exclusive rights, which they have been protected sufficient and they can go for the Blue Reef as usual, but it is not exclusive right. 6. The State government power is on nautical miles only up to 3.Hence Bardi-Jawi claim beyond 12 nautical miles cannot be entertained under any stage. Australian Fishing Industry Council and Commonwealth Government will exercise the rights. The commonwealth government has concurrent jurisdi ction with the State in the claim jurisdiction with the three nautical mile limit to the 12 nautical mile limit. The commonwealth has sole jurisdiction beyond the 12 nautical mile limit around Brue Reef. The claimants made a petition for claiming a native title of the land, which is surrounded by an area of sea to a three nautical mile boundary only.Hence more than the claim not permitted for extension beyond three nautical miles still they go for appeals again and again.  § 7. The State government can grant up to three nautical miles since it recognized the role of owners i. e. Bardi-Jawi who have right to exclusive possession of the land, fishing rights up to three nautical mile limit and the right to hunt turtle and dugong and the right to take resources from Brue Reef. CONCLUSION While taking the decision in connection with bardi-jawi, the following must be noticed by the decision makers.In the Australia, the native tile to land has been established by taking the sources of tr aditional laws and customs of indigenous peoples. The principles of international law linked with the decisions taken in connection with native tile to land. The native law has been developed and justified in the Australia based on different colonial histories and styles of the community were acknowledged. * REFERENCES Appendices, http://www. nntt. gov. au/publications/AR_20052006/appendices. asp? PrintContent=True Australian Constitution Act, http://www. austlii. edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/coaca430/ Claimants celebrate native title decision, 2005, http://www. theage. com. au/news/national/claimants-celebrate-native-title-decision/2005/06/10/1118347602071. html Commonwealth Consolidated Acts, http://www. austlii. edu. au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/nta1993147/s4. html Focus: Native Title – September 2005, http://www. aar. com. au/pubs/nat/fontsep05. htm Frequently Asked questions, http://www. nativetitle. wa. gov. au/about_FAQs. aspx International Law, http://www. ohchr. org/ english/law/index. htm Native Title Act, 1993, http://www. austlii. edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/nta1993147/ Office of Native Title, State Government agency, Western Australia, http://www. nativetitle. wa. gov. au/ Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, http://www. austlii. edu. au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/rda1975202/ Sampi v State of Western Australia (No 3) [2005] FCA 1716, http://www. atns. net. au/agreement. asp? EntityID=3203 http://www. ministers. wa. gov. au/ripper/docs/speeches/bardiprogress. pdf http://www. aph. gov. au/Senate/committee/ntlf_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002-04/nat_nattitle_trib/report/report. pdf http://ntru. aiatsis. gov. au/ntpapers/ip04v3. pdf

The Puritan Origins Of American Schooling - 977 Words

The Puritan Origins of American Schooling: Reaction Paper The readings from the first class surfaced many controversial and prevalent themes. The readings called into question the role education plays in creating a Godly society, a cure for societal ills, enhancing fear, as well as the importance of religious ties. In this paper, I will react to the following themes through a lens of how these beliefs still hold true today. As I read the readings for our first class I felt a sense of frustration and hope. I was frustrated because it remained so incredibly obvious that many of the systems that were created centuries are still alive and well today. However, at the same time I felt hopeful since, many of the puritan values rested on their morals and changes were implemented based upon this. I spend my life fighting against educational inequity, and I am often overwhelmed by the task. Many of the readings mentioned that education served as a means to create a Godly society or used school as a catalyst to cure â€Å"social ills†. I would argue that this is still true today, numerous stakeholders express that education is the key to a bright future. I too believe that if we as educators provided every student with an excellent and rigorous education that we would no longer have such inequality in our nation. However, I have since been forced to situate the deep role that systematic racism, poverty, and violence plays into this utopia. I was pushed on this idea after the murder ofShow MoreRelatedNorth And South Colonial Differences Essay888 Words   |  4 PagesThe Northern and Southern Cultural Differences During the 18th century differences in life, thought, and interests had developed between the Southern and Northern colonies. 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The Implementation Of Moving Freshman Students - 1560 Words

Are you an Obstacle to Change? The change for the implementation of moving freshman students in prior to the other students starting their freshman year. Personal Capacity Y 1. Do I believe I have the personal capacity to figure out how to change the system or practice to achieve the desired outcome? I have the capacity to figure out how to change the system, but the barrier were the Cabinet not approving the change. Since this was new to them, they didn’t understand in some cases you do need to target groups. N 2. Am I will to do the very hard work necessary to plan and implement the change? I am not responsible for the work in this unit, and their deliverables and objectives may have other priorities which would allow this†¦show more content†¦2. Personal Risk Y 1. Can I predict what will happen to me if I promote the change (short-and long term)? May would have alienated some allies that I could have had in my corner for support. Y 2. If the new initiative is a failure, can I withstand the impact in my work environment? If it would have been a failure we would have just removed it from the schedule, but the research clearly shows how these types of program work and any assistance provide to those who are disadvantage allows them to compete better. Emotional N 1. Do I have the intestinal fortitude to work for the vision and slog through resistance and severe criticism? Not that I couldn’t fight the change, but when we really work with conscience and others do not open their mind to changes at times it is hard to navigate through spaces. Sometimes individuals have to learn the hard way and others suffer for it. Social N 1. Am I willing to weaken longstanding personal and professional relationships and reduce trust in order to actualize the vision? I wouldn’t be weakening personal relationships because one thing that I will say is that I am able to separate personal and business. I have had some heated discussions at time, to state things, and after I have stated them we are done with the conversation. Sometimes I have been told that no one wants to see me angry, but I see that also as a cop-out not to have a healthy discussion. Is Your Board